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Abstract 
This study examines the dynamics and outcomes of movements by indigenous communities 
that targeted an agro-industrial investment demanding remedy to adverse impacts on their 
socio-economic conditions. Since the employment of initial institutional tactics, such as 
peaceful protests and petitions, yielded no significant outcomes, the indigenous communities 
escalated their tactics to non-institutional tactics: Violent protests. To respond, the 
government chose a combination of partial repression and moderate concession. To address 
the government responses, as well as the demands of indigenous communities, the company 
mitigated most of the adverse socio-economic impacts. As a result, the indigenous 
communities were able to achieve most of their demands. This paper, therefore, concludes by 
arguing that tactical escalation of indigenous community movements from institutional to 
non-institutional tactics influences the government and company to address the demands of 
indigenous communities, and also shapes the behaviour of the company operating in a host 
country with lax and uncertain regulatory enforcement.  
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Introduction  
 
 In the era of globalisation, capital of foreign companies is being attracted to a number of 
developing countries due in part to increasing demands of the consumer market, the potential 
for lower cost of production, and the existence of unexplored natural resources in host 
countries (Moser, 2001). For these reasons, Cambodia has increasingly attracted a huge 
number of foreign companies since the late 2000s (Ngov, 2011). In the agricultural sector 
alone, the capital increased remarkably from US$27 million in 2005 to US$446 million in 
2009 (CDC, 2010). This was because the government of Cambodia issued a sub-decree on 
Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) to attract foreign investors (RGC, 2005). Through ELCs, 
both domestic and foreign investors gained access to land leases of up to 99 years. A number 
of these investors were reported to have gained access to ELCs because of strong ties and joint 
ventures with local powerful politico-commercial elites, high-ranking officials and politicians 
of the ruling government (Global Witness, 2007; ADHOC, 2013). As of late 2012, at least 2.6 
million hectares of land were granted to both domestic and foreign companies (ADHOC, 
2013), which aimed to generate economic growth, employment and reducing poverty in rural 
communities (RGC, 2005). However, these investments, though not all, have repeatedly been 
accused of deteriorating social, economic and environmental conditions of the marginalised 
communities. Despite the obvious adverse impacts, these investments have survived because 
of, as mentioned above, the establishment of joint ventures with political elites who facilitate 
their operations (Un, 2009). In reaction to these, a number of communities, including 
indigenous communities in north-eastern Cambodia, mobilised against foreign joint venture 
companies’ operations and the Government of Cambodia.  
 This study aims to investigate movements of indigenous communities targeting a 
foreign joint venture company’s investment in rubber plantations in a north-eastern province 
of Cambodia. It explores the dynamics of movements, responses of the government and joint 
venture company, and the outcomes of those movements. In so doing, a within-case process 
tracing method was employed. The method involves “the detailed examination of an aspect of 
a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalisable to 
other events” (George and Bennett, 2005: 5). Given the communities’ historical episodes and 
characteristics, which represent an important contribution to the current theoretical debate 
pertaining to the effect of social movement’s non-institutional and institutional tactics, 
movements of indigenous communities in Bousra commune, Pich Chreada district of 
Mondulkiri Province were selected for empirical observation. In addition to a literature 
 review (reviewing related articles, documents, reports, etc.), the study conducted semi-
structured interviews with 16 key informants,1 and held two focus group discussions, in 
which ten villagers from a different background were invited to participate in each interactive 
discussion. 
 As a result of within case empirical analysis, this study argues that: (i) tactical 
escalation of indigenous community action, from institutional to non-institutional tactics, 
does have significant influence on the government and company to moderately concede to 
and address most of indigenous communities’ demands; and, to a certain degree, (ii) the 
movement of indigenous communities shapes corporate behaviour of a foreign company 
operating in a host developing country with lax and uncertain regulatory enforcement. These 
provide significant implications for contemporary debate pertaining to tactical influence of 
(new) social movement studies, the dynamics and outcomes of movements, which involve 
tripartite actors, and politics of the Government of Cambodia dealing with movements of 
aggrieved groups.  
 To unpack these arguments, the remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. The 
first reviews theoretical frameworks that underpin movements of indigenous communities in 
this case. This is followed by the discussion of historical, cultural and political contexts of 
indigenous communities in the second section, the third section discusses the tactics of a 
movement, including non-institutional and institutional tactics of the indigenous 
communities, and their expected outcomes (demands). The fourth section then analyses the 
mechanism of the government and company towards the indigenous communities. The fifth 
section recaps the outcomes of movements of indigenous communities by comparing the 
demands versus actual outcomes. Last, but not least, the sixth section summarises and 
concludes the dynamics and outcomes of movements, and draws implications of the 
movements.  
 
Theoretical concepts underpinning movement of indigenous communities 
 
To understand how tactical employment determines outcomes of a movement (Gamson, 
1990; McAdam, 1983), it is worth reviewing theoretical concepts of (new) social movement 
                                                 
1  See list of participants in the Appendix. Fieldwork began in August 2013 and finished in January 2014. 
 that underpin movements of the indigenous communities, their targets and influencing tactics, 
responses of government and companies (corporations), and outcomes of movements. 
 
(New) social movement  
 
A social movement is meant to affect change of particular things in society, and is usually 
conducted by a group of people with a particular and common interest and goal (Wilson, 
1973; Tilly, 1978). This underpins several theoretical concepts of social movements, such as 
classical or old social movements, resources mobilisation, and political process. Unlike these 
concepts, new social movements emerge to address contemporary issues of industrialisation. 
 A New Social Movement (NSM) pays more attention to “why”, rather than “how” 
social movements mobilise (Klandermans and Tarrow, 1998). NSM theories emerge in 
response to the narrowly-defined classical Marxism for analysis of collective action that is 
based on relations of production and social class (Buechler, 1995). In spite of the different 
emphasis of NSM (Buechler, 1995), this study is influenced by modernisation or post-
industrial society concepts since it provides implications to the present indigenous movement 
in Cambodia. For instance, NSM is a result of modernisation that causes conflicts, and 
provokes a more defensive kind of resistance (or protest in particular) against the side-effects 
of modernisation, such as economic, technological or political changes (Rucht, 1988). 
Though NSM seems to be well defined, Hall (1995) contends that NSM seems to divert 
scholars’ attention away from political process, and fails to define how organisations are 
formed, how an aggrieved group connects to collective action, and how organisational 
structure affects the types and forms of collective action; this is also clarified by Pichardo 
(1997) in terms of tactics and structures. 
 In terms of structures, NSM tends to organise itself as an ad hoc organisation, and their 
leaderships are rotated and voted on communally. NSM adapts to an anti-bureaucratic 
attitude, in which it organises itself in a more flexible way to avoid oligarisation structure 
(Offe, 1985). In this sense, it creates its own structure that is more responsive to the needs of 
individuals but is with an open, decentralised and non-hierarchical structure (Zimmerman, 
1987, cited in Picardo, 1997). In terms of tactics, NSM uses anti-institutional tactics, but they 
prefer to remain outside formal political channels, and makes use of public opinion and 
disruptive tactics to leverage influence (Tarrow, 1994). Overall, there is no truly distinct 
 tactical style of NSM. Although public opinions and anti-institutional politics have been 
prominent tactics (Pichardo, 1997), these somehow overlap with tactics of other social 
movements, which can be conceptualised to analyse a movement of indigenous communities 
in this study. 
 
Tactics and targets of movements  
 
In NSM scholars suggest several kinds of influential tactics; for instance, institutional versus 
non-institutional action, legal versus illegal action, and violence versus non-violence (Marx 
and McAdam, 1994; McAdam and Tarrow, 2000); as well as non-disruptive and disruptive 
tactics (Cress and Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1990; Giugni, 1998). These tactics are similar and 
known as institutional and non-institutional tactics. While institutional tactics, such as 
peaceful protest, petition, filing complaint, rallies and other forms of non-violence, tend to be 
legal (Cress and Snow, 2000), non-institutional tactics, such as violent protest, sit-ins and any 
harmful activities, are deemed as illegal. Though these tactics are clearly conceptualised, the 
extent to which these tactics leverage influence the most to achieve a movement’s demands 
remains contested (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). Meanwhile, other scholars argue that not 
only the tactical employment per se, but also the selection of the target is imperative to 
leveraging influence and attaining the outcomes of a movement. Having understood the 
vulnerability of the targets, the better chance a movement has of succeeding (Van Dyke et al., 
2005). Due to these contested arguments, this study, however, observes how the indigenous 
communities employ both non-institutional and institutional tactics to leverage influence. 
 Although targets of NSM remain debated (Schurman, 2004; Van Dyke et al., 2005; 
Wood, 2004), Soule (2009, 2012) contends that the targets of a movement can be both a 
government/state and a corporation. In the past, movements more often than not targeted 
governments or states, but in the era of globalisation and increasing corporate power, the 
target of movements turns to companies or corporations (Soule, 2009). Yet, this study 
believes that at least one government is a claimant—an object of claim or a party to claim 
(McAdam et al., 2001). So, the government may act as a mediator or regulator (Soule, 2009). 
For instance, Walker et al. (2008) argue that government has stronger capabilities not only to 
regulate corporations, but also to address hostile groups’ claims when a contention involves 
three actors (government, corporations and movement organisations). In this study, the 
 company is deemed as a primary and an ultimate target, while the government as a secondary 
target. However, the government is perceived to possess stronger power in mediating 
contention between indigenous communities and the company. 
 
Government and corporations responses  
 
In response to a movement, according to Goldstone and Tilly (2001), a government may opt 
for any of the four modes of response: tolerance, concession, repression, or a combination of 
repression and concession. Further to Goldstone and Tilly’s (2001), Cai (2010) similarly 
defines that: (i) concession—a movement succeeds as the demands are fully addressed; (ii) 
concession with discipline—a movement’s demands are addressed but some or all protesters 
are punished; (iii) tolerance—a movement’s demands are ignored or tolerated; and (iv) 
repression—a movement’s demands are ignored and some or all protesters are published. 
However, neither Cai (2010), nor Goldstone and Tilly (2001) define in what way a 
government concedes. When a movement involves three actors, the study endorses Soule’s 
(2009, 2012) argument that, in the age of increasing corporate power, a government is 
involved as an intermediary or a regulator. In essence, this study defines a mechanism of 
government’s concession as a process of regulating the corporations to address the demands 
of movements. By regulating, it means the process of (re-) enforcing relevant regulations to 
regulate corporations operating in a host or a country’s jurisdiction. The enforcement can be 
escalated, to borrow from Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), from persuading, warning, monetary 
penalising, and criminal complaining to suspending and revoking of licenses. This may 
compel the corporations to address the demands of a movement or to comply with the 
government’s intervention. 
 As mechanism of response to either the government or movements, this study 
postulates that corporations have two options, regardless of other mode of corporations’ 
response policies. First, if the contention involves a government as an intermediary, once the 
government concedes the corporations have to comply with government’s concession to 
address the demands of a movement. Second, if government does not concede, corporations 
simply ignore the demands of a movement (cf. Soule, 2009). Otherwise, if movements turn to 
target corporations directly, and successfully threaten corporations’ revenue portfolio and 
reputation, corporations may concede by changing their policies to address movements’ 
 demands (King, 2008). Influenced by these, the study observes how the company concedes 
by changing its behaviour, and complying with the concessions of the government and the 
protests of the indigenous communities.  
 
Defining outcomes of movements 
 
The ultimate goal of a movement is to bring about positive change as an outcome. Yet, the 
definition of success or failure outcome of movements is elusive, since the extant literature of 
social movements have generally paid less attention to outcomes (Giugni, 1998). If the 
outcomes are emphasised, scholars tend to focus on broad aspects, such as political, 
economic, social, cultural and policy changes (Cai, 2010; Cress and Snow, 2000; Giugni, 
1999; Marx and McAdam, 1994). To generalise outcomes, other scholars suggest two 
important types of outcomes: direct outcomes, including securing constituent benefits and 
achieving new advantages from the target (Burstein, 1999; Gamson, 1990; Isaac and Kelly, 
1981); and indirect outcomes, including public perception, biographical changes (Gusfield, 
1984; McAdam, 1988), cultural changes and institutional effects lately (Giugni, 1998). While 
direct outcomes are simply defined as goals or demands of movements, indirect outcomes are 
claimed as unexpected consequences generated from indirect influence of movements (Cress 
and Snow, 2000). Influenced by these, this study aims at investigating direct outcomes, which 
are about remedying adverse socio-economic impacts on the indigenous communities. 
Though success or failure outcome of a particular movement remains contested (Gamson, 
1990; Steedly and Foley, 1979), the study understands that movements succeed when their 
demands are fully or moderately addressed by the targets, and they fail otherwise. Regardless 
of the several theoretical factors that underpin success or failure of a movement claimed by 
McAdam (1999), Tarrow (1998), Tilly (1978), Goldstone and Tilly (2001) and Cai (2010), 
this study perceives that tactical influence, as argued by McAdam (1983) and Gamson 
(1990), is a major factor contributing to success or failure of a movement. 
 
Cultural and political contexts of indigenous communities in north-eastern Cambodia  
 
In order to analyse movements of indigenous communities, their demands and expectations, 
and their interactions with the government and company, it is necessary to understand their 
 political, cultural and historical contexts. Politically and historically, north-eastern provinces 
of Cambodia, especially Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces, used to be the first Khmer 
Rouge’s strongholds where they mobilised indigenous communities to resist the government 
in the late 1960s (Colm, 1996; Baird, 2008). During the control of the Khmer Rouge from 
1975 to 1979, some of indigenous communities who did not join the Khmer Rouge relocated 
themselves to the border of Vietnam. They returned back after the collapse of Khmer Rouge 
in late 1979. Since the mid-1980s until the present, the indigenous people have re-established 
their relationship with the government ruled by Cambodian People’s Party. They have, 
however, struggled with legal status and their traditions. 
 Coupled with change in Cambodia’s political system from communism (1980s) to 
democracy (1990s), the indigenous communities in the north-eastern provinces have legally 
drawn attention of the ruling party. In pursuit of ruling party’s political interests, related 
regulations and laws were adopted to support the indigenous communities. In 2001, the Land 
Law was adopted by the government to formally recognise indigenous communities’ 
collective land or properties ownership (Keating, 2013). Following that, the Forestry Law of 
2002 also recognises the rights of the indigenous communities that are registered by the state. 
In 2009, the government issued a sub-decree on Procedures of Registration of Land of 
Indigenous Communities. These two laws and a sub-decree require the indigenous 
communities to register their collective land ownership in order to secure communal land 
titles (see Footnotes 5 and 6). So far, a few out of the hundred indigenous communities in the 
north-eastern provinces have successfully registered their communal land title (Milne, 2013). 
Besides the lack of financial support, the remaining communities have struggled with the 
complex and bureaucratic land registration system of the government. 
 Culturally, for centuries the indigenous communities in the north-eastern provinces 
have had a distinct culture from the Khmer people. This includes, for example, their 
language, agricultural practices, religious practices and organisational relations within their 
communities. Their agricultural practices are based on a rotational form of cultivation, which 
relies on slash-and-burn of the forest to establish a cultivatable field for a few years, and then 
moving to another location before returning back to the previous one. Their livelihoods are 
based on natural resource products, including non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (e.g., 
resins, vegetables, mushrooms, honey rattan, bamboo shoots, etc.). Though their religious 
practices are ascribed as animist, a number of indigenous people have converted to 
 Christianity and Buddhism. Despite such conversion, a large number of communities still 
worship forest and their ancestors’ cemeteries. As a result of regionalisation and an increase 
in the penetration of a cash economy into the north-eastern areas, indigenous people’s ways 
of barter have recently transformed from goods exchanges to cash payments. This has 
prompted the indigenous people’s desires and needs for money, for which it causes social 
problems, such as internal conflicts, theft, selecting marriage partners, etc. (Backstrom et al., 
2007). 
 Given their rich soil fertility and natural resources, the north-eastern provinces have 
since the late 1990s attracted a cash crop economy. Some of the indigenous people’s farms 
have been converted into cash crop plantations, such as cashew nuts, rubber, mangoes, 
jackfruit, avocadoes, cassava and other perennial cash crops. These generated addition 
income and also substituted the seasonal rice shortage of the indigenous communities. 
Medium-scale plantations of such cash crops have increasingly flourished in these indigenous 
communities’ areas (Backstrom et al., 2007). Since the early 2000s, with a significant 
increase in the demand for agricultural products, the north-eastern provinces (Kratie, Steng 
Treng, Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri) have attracted a number of large-scale foreign and 
domestic investments. These large-scale land investments, including mining, logging and 
agro-industrial concessions are reported to have linked with politico-commercial elites and 
officials of the ruling party (McAndrew and IL, 2009). Since related regulations (prior 
consultation and consent, impact assessments) have not been enforced properly by the 
government, and well complied with by the investors, these investments have caused adverse 
effects on cultural, socio-economic and environmental aspects of the indigenous communities 
in these north-eastern provinces.  
 
A movement of indigenous communities in north-eastern Cambodia: Causes and 
demands 
 
Home to a number of indigenous communities, including the Bunong (Phnong), Kren, Jaray, 
Krorl, Steang, Khmon, Kouy and Tumpoun, to name a few, Mondulkiri province has 
attracted a number of foreign joint venture companies. In 2005, the government started 
granting Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) to both domestic and foreign companies to 
invest in rubber or other cash crop plantations. As of May 2012, 15 ELCs were awarded by 
 the government. These ELCs extend on the total area of approximately 94,731 hectares, 
which are mostly located in Bousra and Krang Teh communes of Pich Chreada district. In 
Bousra commune, two companies among others (namely, Apple and Orange)2 were granted 
ELCs in 2008. Apple was awarded about 3,000 hectares, and Orange was awarded about 
4,500 hectares, respectively for a 70-year concession period. After almost a year of land 
preparation, a Belgium company, namely Sophia,3 in a joint venture with Cambo, a local 
company, took over the management and operation of the two ELCs. Sophia holds 70% and 
Cambo owns the rest of the shares. Currently, these two ELCs are operating in the name of 
Sophia-Cambo (the company, hereafter). The owner of Cambo is known as a tycoon holding 
the title of Oukna (wealthy person), which is bestowed by the King at the request of the 
government once he or she contributes about US$100,000 to national development, and as a 
private advisor to the Prime Minister (FIDH, 2011). Evidence suggests that, though the owner 
of Cambo is an Oukna, he is not an active politician, nor a financial sponsor of the ruling 
party, the Cambodian People’s Party, when compared to other tycoons. Yet, this relationship 
could facilitate access to ELCs and long-term operation of the rubber plantation. 
 With a total population of 1,063 households (equivalent to 4,810 people), Bousra 
commune consists of seven villages. The majority of them are indigenous people (Phnong). 
As explained in the previous section, their livelihoods are based on agricultural production, 
such as shifting cultivation and lowland rice cultivation; collecting NTFPs: resin, honey, 
bamboo or bamboos shoot, vine, rattan, wild fruits and vegetables; cash crop plantations, 
including beans, cashew nuts and sesame; and livestock raising. In early 2008, the indigenous 
communities were surprised and shocked as the company cleared not only indigenous 
people’s farmland, but also vacant land and (worship) forestland, cottages, and other crop 
plantations. These caused adverse effects on the socio-economic conditions of about 850 
families (FIDH, 2011). As a result, tension between the company and the affected indigenous 
communities (AIC, hereafter) erupted. In the same year, the AIC launched several kinds of 
collective action seeking to influence the government and company to remedy the 
unfavourable impacts. In particular, the AIC demanded that the government and company: 
                                                 
2  All names are pseudonyms, which are given to comply with research ethics and consent made between 
the researcher and participants from the company. 
3  Registered in Luxembourg, Sophia is owned by French industrial group and Belgian families. The 
company has also joined UN Global Compact for Corporate Social Responsibility (FIDH, 2011). 
  
1. Conserve the remaining cemetery and worship forests, and celebrate sacrificed 
ceremony. As above, the Phnong is one of the indigenous communities who worship 
forests and cemeteries. They believe that the spiritual forest protects them from 
having sickness, disaster and encroachment of evil;  
2. Return farmland or otherwise pay a fair cash compensation. The company cleared and 
damaged the indigenous communities’ traditional agriculture, such as shifting 
farming, farmland and other plantations. Around 1,500 hectares of the AIC’s 
plantations were lost to the company. This worsened their livelihood;4 
3. Remedy the loss of income from collecting NTFPs. With the endorsement of the 
government, the company cleared forestland where indigenous communities used to 
collect NTFPs for selling after daily consumption. This caused adverse effects on 
communities’ livelihood and income; 
4. Re-comply with relevant regulations. The company contravened the rights to 
collective ownership of indigenous communities, which are stated in Articles 23 to 28 
of the 2001 Land Law, and Article 37 of the 2002 Forestry Law;5 and  
5. Respect land rights of the indigenous communities. The government and companies 
violated indigenous communities’ collective properties, shifting cultivation, other 
forms of traditional agricultural activities and worship sites of the indigenous 
communities. These collective properties are recognised by the 2001 Land Law, and 
the Sub-decree on the Procedures of Registration of the Land of Indigenous 
Communities.6 
 
                                                 
4  P11 (see the Appendix). 
5  Article 37 of the Forestry Law (2002) requires concessionaires to make sure their operations do not 
interfere with the “Customary user rights taking place on land property of an indigenous community that is 
registered with the state consistent with the Land Law; and customary access and user rights practiced by 
communities residing within, or adjacent to forest concessions.” The company also violated other international 
conventions rectified by the Government of Cambodia, yet this is out of scope of this paper. 
6  According to Article 23 of the Land Law (2001), an indigenous community is defined as “a group of 
people that resides in the territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia whose members manifest ethnic, social and 
cultural and economic unity and who practice a traditional lifestyle, and who cultivate the lands in their 
possessions according to customary rules of collective use.” 
 As defined in the theoretical section, a movement of the AIC succeeds only if the above 
demands are fully or moderately addressed by the government and company. To influence the 
government and company, the AIC orchestrated both institutional and non-institutional 
tactics. 
 
Tactical influence of the affected indigenous communities  
 
To influence the government and company to address their demands, the AIC launched two 
stages of mobilisation. Corroborating to theoretical concepts, the indigenous communities 
initially employed institutional tactics, such as petitions, peaceful protest, and targeting the 
government in hopes of influencing and regulating the company. 
 
Institutional tactics  
 
In April 2008, as the company began to clear plantations, cemeteries and worship forest, the 
AIC consulted with village heads and the latter submitted a petition to commune and district 
offices to seek intervention. On several occasions,7 the commune and district offices could 
not postpone the company’s activities. In May 2008, about a hundred representatives of the 
AIC protested at the provincial office of Mondulkiri to seek intervention from provincial 
governors, as well as provincial sectoral (agriculture, environment, land) departments. Again, 
no significant result was offered, though National Authorities for the Resolution of Land 
Disputes intervened, they just provided empty promises. Later, in October 2008, the 
representatives of the AIC filed petitions regarding the adverse impacts caused by the 
company’s operations with the Councils of Ministers, the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), and 
the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction in Phnom Penh. The 
AIC claimed that there was no immediate response or any intervention undertaken by these 
concerned institutions.  
 In addition to the above, a number of local NGOs8 were involved in mediating the 
dispute, and investigating the detrimental impacts. On behalf of the AIC, the local NGOs 
                                                 
7  P08 (see the Appendix). 
8  Community Legal Education Centre, ADHOC, Caritas, My Village, and Indigenous Communities 
Support Organisation, to mention a few. 
 jointly submitted a number of legal memoranda to the government and the company to seek 
solutions. The local NGOs furthermore provided legal advice and trainings to empower the 
AIC. Though a number of representatives of the indigenous communities were selected to be 
spokespersons in the seven villages of Bousra commune, they were not confident in the 
NGOs. The spokespersons perceived that the NGOs just came to console them, not to take 
serious action while their land was being confiscated without due reason.9 Having perceived 
that institutional tactics yielded no result, they then escalated to non-institutional tactics.  
 
Tactical escalation from institutional to non-institutional tactics  
 
Tactical escalation typically involves dramatic or innovative instruments, as well as 
provocation that tests the vulnerabilities of one’s foe (O'Brien and Li, 2006). It is usually 
staged by protesters to exert extra pressure on their foes since the protesters’ previous 
influential tactics did not work. In this case, as the institutional tactics produced no 
satisfactory result and influence, as claimed by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), the AIC 
escalated to non-institutional tactics (violent protest) to leverage harmful pressure directly on 
the company and indirectly on the government.  
 On 20 December 2008, after gathering at the commune office, about 50010 indigenous 
people were outraged and marched with sticks, axes, bottles of gasoline, lighters, knives, 
etc.11 from the commune office to the concession areas, where a number of bulldozers were 
clearing worship forestland, and indigenous people’s plantations and farmland. As the crowd 
of protesters arrived, the company’s bulldozers fearlessly continued clearing; the AIC then 
fiercely incinerated three bulldozers, and damaged the fourth. In addition, protesters also 
destroyed a number of rubber saplings. The AIC staged violent protest because they 
intuitively perceived that, without forceful pressure, the company would not suspend their 
activities to solve the problem and to address the AIC’s demands. 
  
The people thought that, this company, if we did not forcefully put pressure on it, it would not 
solve the problem. The people were then outraged. After violently throwing stones at the 
                                                 
9  P03 (see the Appendix). 
10  P05 (see the Appendix). 
11  P03 (see the Appendix). 
 commune office’s roof, we organised our force to burn down the tractors and bulldozers 
because the company did not listen to the suggestions of the villagers.12 
 
Even though policemen and armed forces, who were hired to protect the company’s property, 
were observing the violent protest, they took no action to disperse the outraged protest. They 
instead begged the protesters not to destroy the property of the companies.  
 
We saw the policemen went with the villagers but they did not do anything … the policemen 
begged and apologised to the villagers to stop burning and destroying. This is an outraged act 
of the villagers. It was because the commune councils and provincial authorities did not solve 
the problem. The violence erupted because of the lack of a detailed study and consultation 
with the villagers.13 
 
Overall, non-institutional tactics employed by the AIC generated significant pressure directly 
on the company, and indirectly on the government. According to the law on peaceful 
assembly (2009), violent protest is illegal in Cambodia. If violent protests are organised, the 
concerned authorities are automatically authorised to crack down or take any suppressive 
measures. In addition to this law, theory likewise claims that violent protest tends to face 
severe repression (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001). However, neither the government, nor the 
company’s guards took immediate measures against the violent protest. The AIC claimed that 
the company violently destroyed their properties without prior consent and/or consultation; 
thus, the indigenous communities were victims,14 not the company.  
  
Government responses: A combination of light repression and moderate concession  
 
Theoretically, a government can choose repression, concession, tolerance or a combination of 
concession and repression in response to a movement. In this case, the government, as an 
intermediary, prefers a combination of concession and repression, but repression tends to be 
light, while concession tends to be moderate. To repress, the government and company used 
                                                 
12  P05 (see the Appendix). 
13  P05 (see the Appendix). 
14  P05 (see the Appendix). 
 the judicial system to retaliate against the indigenous communities’ violent protest. On 12 
January 2009, policemen and the provincial court, based on complaints by the company, 
arrested three representatives of the AIC and summoned another three representatives. These 
representatives were going to be charged of robbery and arson; however, due to persistent 
protest of the indigenous communities in front of the provincial court, the six representatives 
were released the same day. However, the release was on bail; if they spoke to the media, 
human rights groups (NGOs), or held violent protests again, they would be arrested and 
imprisoned. This was done to intimidate the ringleaders and protesters not to stage future 
protests. The government, however, claimed that the representatives were just summoned to 
be interrogated and, if the government had arrested the representatives, they would had to be 
charged for the destruction of the company's property. 
 To concede, after the violent protest, the government actively started re-enforcing 
existing regulations, such as the sub-decree on ELCs, an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA), and acknowledging its malfeasance. In doing so, the government acted as a mediator 
to re-enforce its regulations, as claimed by Soule (2009). In regulatory theory, there are five 
levels of regulatory enforcement strategies—persuading, warning, monetary penalising, 
criminal charging, and revoking licenses—to be employed to ensure regulatory compliance 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). As an initial stage of enforcement, the government, in this 
case, negotiated with the company to re-fulfil regulatory requirements and to mitigate the 
adverse socio-economic impacts, as claimed by the AIC.  
 
We had not done anything that was strict or forceful to the company, not at all ... In practice, 
the provincial authorities, concerned provincial departments, village and commune heads, 
mediated the conflict. This mediation did not mean that we put pressure on the company to 
solve the problem at all … All in all, the protest of the villagers against the company was 
correct ...15 
 
As a concession, the government then formulated a tripartite committee, which consisted of 
government officials (local authorities, provincial sectoral departments), the company, and 
the representatives of the AIC, to mitigate adverse impacts. The committee identified and 
demarcated the overlapping farmland, rice paddies, and other crop plantations of the 
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 indigenous families. With the overlapping area identified and demarcated, the committee 
introduced three options to address the claims of the indigenous families: cash compensation, 
land swaps and joint-rubber plantation and development16 (see mitigations and development 
section). Besides this, the company also agreed to mitigate the other adverse impacts claimed 
by the AIC. 
 Another applicable concession of the government was the Prime Minister’s (PM) Sub-
decree on a moratorium on ELCs. On 7 May 2012, a month and a year before the commune 
councils and national assembly elections in 2012 and 2013, respectively, the PM issued (in 
Circular No. 001) a moratorium to temporarily suspend granting new ELCs (Subedi, 2012). 
The reason behind this regulatory concession was to attract the votes of those ELCs with 
affected communities and families. If there was no such intervention, the ruling party of the 
PM would be at stake if large-scale social protests were to happen throughout the country 
(see Footnote 17). This moratorium was applicable to most of ELCs, granted to both 
domestic and foreign investors, that induced adverse impacts. The issuance aimed at revoking 
inactive and exploitive ELCs, solving land disputes between the affected communities and 
concessionaires by introducing a “leopard skin policy” and issuing private land titles for the 
rightful claimants. I.e., lands that overlap with concession areas have to be ceded out (like 
leopard skin) and be officially returned with the land title to the rightful claimants (in this 
case, the villagers). To do so, numerous students from different local universities were asked 
for assistance. The moratorium on ELCs proved that the government re-enforced its 
regulations and conceded according to not only the claims of AIC in this rubber contention, 
but also other aggrieved communities in the country.17  
 
Company responses 
 
As explained in the theoretical section, the responses of the company rely on the government 
responses. To respond to the AIC and be in line with the government’s concession, the 
company conceded by complying with the relevant regulations, mitigating adverse impacts 
and adopting self-regulation.  
                                                 
16  P01, P05 and P10 (see the Appendix). 
17  During the indigenous communities’ movements, there were several other movements or protests 
orchestrated by other ELC-affected communities in the country. 
  
Regulatory compliance  
 
To comply with the government’s re-enforcement, a local consulting company was hired to 
conduct full a Social and Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA).18 The SEIA was 
concluded in September 2010 but local NGOs and the AIC alleged that the quality of the 
SEIA was insufficient, and that there were gaps between the mitigation plans and the actual 
practices.19 Despite the criticism, both the company and the government claimed that the 
company had done better in terms of regulatory compliance, compared to the other ELC 
companies in Cambodia.20  
 
We know that we are in the foreign country … All the regulations and the laws exist. For 
example, here in Cambodia, one company is allowed to have around 10,000 hectares of 
economic land concession. We know that, we respect that … We just see that other 
companies do not do the same … they have more than 40,000 hectares. I do not know how 
they did that, with the rules that exist in the country.21 
 
In addition, the company complied with the ELC moratorium. As the students arrived at the 
concession area, they ceded about 300 hectares from the concession area to the rightful claim 
of the villagers.22 The company claimed that it was unfair to them because the villagers 
always wanted land in various areas. Not having been informed and consulted beforehand, 
the company claimed that the demarcation of the students was not conducted in a systematic 
way. 
 
After the declaration of Prime Minister Hun Sen, suddenly there were new people that said 
they have a piece of land there but they could not prove it. The students did a lot of 
                                                 
18  P09 (see the Appendix). 
19  P07 (see the Appendix). 
20  P10 (see the Appendix). 
21  P09 (see the Appendix). 
22  Rightful claim is assessed in terms of being able to prove having land with crop plantations and other 
cultivation. 
 demarcation inside the concession area. In total, they cut out 300 hectares. But not in the area 
that I planted but some are around the rivers.23 
 
The company nevertheless ignored the carving since the students carved only land located 
along the river's edge and vacant land where the company had not planted rubber. Yet, the 
moratorium, due to the lack of methodological enforcement, adversely affected not only the 
company, but also the communal land (collective land ownership) of the indigenous 
communities (see historical background), which is not subject to be split into individual land 
ownership. Upon receiving individual land titles, a number of indigenous families sold their 
land to Khmer or Vietnamese in Bousra commune. Although the moratorium was, in fact, 
quickly enforced to maintain the support of these families in the upcoming elections in May 
2012 and July 2013, it also benefited those affected families. 
 
Mitigations and development  
 
To mitigate the adverse impacts claimed by the AIC, the company carried out several 
activities. First, to compensate for some parts of the worship forest that were razed, the 
company celebrated with a sacrificial ceremony by killing buffalo (which costs between 
US$300 to US$500), offering indigenous people’s wine (about US$100 for few jars), and 
other traditional dances, to console the spirit of the forest.24 Second, the company conserved 
not only the remaining worship forest and cemeteries, but also the forest along the river's 
edge. This would help indigenous communities have access to NTFPs for their livelihoods. 
Also, the forest located along the river's edge would also help protect against soil erosion and 
landslides. 
 Third and last, following several discussion and negotiation meetings, the tripartite 
committee came up with three options to compensate and develop the livelihoods of the AIC. 
The first option was cash compensation or selling the land to the company. The company 
agreed with the government to compensate in cash about US$200-250 per hectare. Each 
indigenous household received a different price based on their actual type of land and 
plantations. To compensate for perennial fruit trees, such as cashew nuts, mangoes, jackfruit, 
                                                 
23  P09 (see the Appendix). 
24  FDG1 (see the Appendix). 
 etc., the company paid about US$2.50 per fruit tree. However, a fruit tree was paid for only if 
it bore fruit at the time of company’s land clearing. Approximately 350 households opted for 
cash compensation. Nevertheless, some indigenous people complained that they were forced 
to accept cash compensation or to sell their land to the company, but the government rejected 
this allegation.25 Some of the AIC further claimed that the cash compensation was too cheap, 
and that they could not acquire another plot of land for cultivation. Despite the AIC’s 
accusation, the government and the company affirmed that cash compensation was paid 
based on current land’s market price at that time.26  
 The second option was joint-rubber plantation and development. The company 
allocated plots of land to the indigenous families to plant rubber. In addition to free technical 
assistance, the company offered fertilisers and replacement rubber saplings as loans. The 
families who opted for this option have to repay the loan upon tapping latex from the 9th to 
the 20th years. The latex can be sold at market price to the company. As a result, the company 
allocated about 300 hectares to a number of indigenous families who chose joint-rubber 
plantation schemes, and signed 60-year agreements with the company. Still, some of the 
participant families complained that the government and company confiscated their land, and 
leased it back to them for 60 years. Thus, they are ultimately not the owners of their land 
either. The company asserted that, it was beyond their capability since it was awarded only a 
70-year concession period, not a life-long concession. The land belongs to the government, 
not the company.27 Because maintaining rubber trees needed intensive care and full-time 
labour, some families were not happy and, as of late 2013, they quit and secretly sold plots of 
rubber trees at about US$1,500 to US$2,000 per hectare to Khmer people, either from within 
Bousra commune or Phnom Penh city.  
 The third option was a land swap. The company reserved land in another location to 
exchange with the indigenous families who lost land to the concession. None of the affected 
families opted for this option since the reserved land was an outcrop area, and far from 
villages.28 The reserved land was located outside the concession area since the government 
and company perceived that, having indigenous families’ land mixed with the rubber 
                                                 
25  P10 (see the Appendix). 
26  P09 (see the Appendix). 
27  P09 (see the Appendix). 
28  FDG1 and FDG2 (see the Appendix). 
 plantation areas, would cause further troubles, such as fire, damaging rubber trees and 
security.29  
 Other than the above, and to deal with livelihood concerns, the company motivated the 
indigenous people to work in their rubber farm. The government and company claimed that 
they created jobs, and employed a thousand indigenous people in Bousra commune. Jobs, to a 
lesser extent, compensated an equivalent amount of income they used to earn from collecting 
and selling NTFPs. Those indigenous families with higher education and skills were able to 
upgrade their livelihood better than those unskilled workers.30  
 
Codes of conduct and corporate responsibility 
 
To cope with other social impacts, the company regulated itself. Self-regulation, as discussed 
in the theoretical section, illuminates the autonomy of the rubber company from the local 
partner and the government. This is quite different compared to those joint ventures whose 
shareholders, such as powerful elites, officials and politicians, influence the process of 
decision making either to concede to the demands of affected communities or to self-regulate. 
According to FIDH (2011), the company developed its own Codes of Conduct (CoC) in 
2009, after encountering the AIC movement, and being taken over by the foreign company 
(Sophia). The CoC is to be complied with by employees, entities of the group, as well as the 
company’s suppliers and consultants. Thus, the CoC is a by-product of the AIC movement in 
Bousra commune. The CoC consists of non-discrimination in the workplace, respecting 
human rights, working conditions, sexual harassment, child and forced labour, and 
corruption.31  
 
We have our company standard that is quite strict … I do not think you can find other 
companies that are doing the same ... how do they deal with the population? … What they do 
is, they take the bulldozers and kick the people outside … For us, it is our social responsibility 
to the population.32 
                                                 
29  P09 and P10 (see the Appendix). 
30  FDG1(see the Appendix). 
31  P09 (see the Appendix). 
32  P09 (see the Appendix). 
  
To comply with its CoC, the company constructed accommodation for its employees and 
provided a health service to both employees and non- and regular workers. Besides its social 
responsibilities, both the government and the AIC acknowledged that the company had done 
a lot of community development work in Bousra commune. Their focus was on health, 
education and infrastructure development. Annually, the company maintained and improved 
roads inside Bousra commune. For education and health, the company renovated two primary 
schools’ classrooms, supported school materials, teachers’ salaries and materials for a health 
centre. Like elsewhere, however, the AIC complained that these corporate social activities 
generated a minimal contribution to livelihood improvement of the affected indigenous 
communities.33  
 
Outcomes of the movement of indigenous communities 
 
This section compares the demands and the actual outcomes obtained by the AIC, especially 
after the tactical escalation to non-institutional tactics. To reiterate, AIC movements succeed 
only when the government and company fully or moderately address demands to a certain 
level of satisfaction of the AIC. Based on the responses of the government and company, it is 
arguable that AIC movements achieve most of their demands. To recap, the AIC achieved 
four out of five expected socio-economic outcomes.  
 First, the company complied with the government, as well the demands of the AIC by 
conducting an SEIA and carving land from the concession area for the AIC. Second, the 
government and company successfully dealt with the worship forest by conserving and 
celebrating sacrificial ceremonies. Third, to mitigate livelihood and land issues, the company 
offered cash compensation, and introduced joint-rubber plantations to improve livelihoods of 
the AIC, in addition to employing indigenous people. Last, to cope with the business 
environment in Cambodia and to maintain its reputation in the international market arena, the 
company regulates itself by developing codes of conduct and implemented corporate social 
responsibility. As explained above, codes of conduct is an independent decision making of 
the company and also a byproduct of movements of the AIC.  
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  However, the government and company failed to clearly address the violation of 
indigenous and human rights. Since there is no clear mechanism of addressing human rights 
and the rights of indigenous communities in Cambodia, the government and company 
claimed that they had addressed most of the issues. If the issues were not dealt with, the AIC 
movements would otherwise endure. In spite of this contested argument, it can be concluded 
that the AIC movement succeeded because they achieved most of their demands. Most of the 
affected indigenous families felt satisfied with the outcomes, though a few affected families 
were not satisfied.34 These achievements would foster better performance of the company and 
government towards the socio-economic sustainability of indigenous communities in the cash 
economy era. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has fleshed out the dynamics and outcomes of indigenous communities’ 
movements targeting an agro-industrial investment, which was endorsed by the government. 
Initially, the indigenous communities targeted the government by employing institutional 
tactics, such as peaceful protest and filing petitions with several government institutions in 
the hope of influencing the government to regulate the company. Since these tactics 
leveraged no significant influence, the indigenous communities shifted to non-institutional 
tactics, in which they employed violent protest: burning and destroying bulldozers and 
tractors to exert influence directly on the company, and indirectly on the government. As 
mechanisms of response, the government chose a combination of light repression and 
moderate concession. Initially, and to repress, the government selectively detained some 
protesters, who were thereafter released on bail. Later, and to concede, the government 
negotiated with the company and re-enforced relevant regulations (sub-decrees on ELCs, and 
an environmental impact assessment). The shift from repression to concession by the 
government is to some extent influenced by the national political environment, especially the 
commune councils and national assembly elections in 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
Compelled by the movements of the indigenous communities, switching to concession was 
                                                 
34  FDG1 and FDG2 (see the Appendix). Due to differing expectations of the indigenous people, some 
families were not happy with the solution. 
 thus opted to placate the communities to vote for the ruling party. These concessive responses 
then shaped the company responses. 
 As a mechanism of response, the company: (i) complied with government’s regulatory 
re-enforcement by conducting social and environmental impact studies, and returning the 
overlapping land to the communities; (ii) mitigated adverse socio-economic impacts; and (iii) 
self-regulated by developing codes of conduct, and implementing corporate social 
responsibility to harmonise and ensure long-term investment in the indigenous communities. 
With these mechanisms of response, indigenous communities achieved most of their 
demands. These positive responses would contribute to the socio-economic sustainability of 
the indigenous communities and their future development. This large-scale rubber plantation 
would contribute to improved economic conditions of the indigenous communities, but some 
aspects of their culture (such as belief, worship, relationships, traditional cultivation) would 
be altered by the influx of economic migrants and other development. Conservation of the 
forest and other natural resources, which are present and future sources of livelihood of the 
indigenous people who have not adapted themselves to the current cash economy are at stake 
if there is no effective management and enforcement of regulations (Sokphea, 2015).  
 With the above responses of the government and company, and results of movements, 
it is arguable that the tactical escalation of indigenous communities from institutional to non-
institutional tactics exerted indirect influence on the government in the hope of regulating the 
company. These movements furthermore shaped the behaviour of the company, which is 
operating in a host country with lax and uncertain regulatory enforcement, to behave in a 
more sustainable way towards the indigenous communities. This experience might inspire 
future social movements of indigenous communities elsewhere if public consultation, social 
and environmental impacts and other regulations are not effectively enforced by the 
government or complied with by the private companies. In pursuit of sustainable 
development and common interests of the communities, these movements would to some 
extent tackle exploitative and rent-seeking investments of foreign companies and the local 
politico-commercial elites of this regime.  
 Regardless of other factors explaining outcomes (either success or failure), this study, 
corroborating with Cai (2010), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), Gamson (1990), Steedly and 
Foley (1979) and Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), argues that the use of tactics has certain 
influence on the targets to address the aggrieved groups’ demands. In this case, non-
 institutional (violent) tactics, however, tend to be more effective than the institutional tactics. 
This has significant implications not only for tactical employment of (new) social 
movements, but also contention that involves the government, the indigenous communities 
and the private company, which has not been well discussed in contemporary social 
movement studies. 
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 Appendix: List of participants 
 
Code Title Interviewed 
P01 Ex- Commune Chief 19 Nov 2013 
P02 Village Chief 1 19 Nov 2013 
P03 Villagers Representative 1 18 Nov 2013 
P04 Villagers Representative 2 17 Nov 2013 
P05 Villagers Representative 3 18 Nov 2013 
P06 Deputy Director of Provincial Department of Agriculture 23 Dec 2013 
P07 Provincial Manager-NGO 08 Jan 2014 
P08 Village Chief 2 18 Nov 2013 
P09 CEO of ELCs 23 Dec 2013 
P10 Deputy Provincial Governor  10 Jan 2014 
P11 Village Chief 3 18 Nov 2013 
P12 Independent Researcher 26 Nov 2013 
P13 Lecturer  02 Jan 2014 
P14 Independent Researcher 02 Dec 2013 
P15 Deputy Provincial Manager-NGO 07 Jan 2014 
P16 ELCs Officer of Ministry of Agriculture 03 Dec 2013 
FDG1 Focus Group Discussion (FDG) in Pu Toeut Village 17 Nov 2013 
FDG2 Focus Group Discussion in La Mesh Village 17 Nov 2013 
 
 
